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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 03-1734
            
EVELEAN SOBHI MALACK NASSRALAH,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
          
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(A74 808 862)
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 15, 2004
Before: Sloviter, Rendell and Aldisert, Circuit Judges.
(Filed January 28, 2004)
           
OPINION OF THE COURT
         
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Evelean Sobhi Malack Nassralah filed this petition for review challenging the
2February 21, 2003 Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirmance of the decision
of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Nassralah’s application for asylum and
withholding of deportation.  In this petition for review, we must decide whether the
Board’s determination that Nassralah failed to establish asylum eligibility by credible
testimony is supported by substantial evidence.  We will deny the petition for review.
Nassralah is a twenty-five year old woman, native and citizen of Egypt, who
entered the United States as a visitor in 1996.  She was permitted to remain here until
December 3, 1996, but remained beyond that period and was placed in deportation
proceedings.  She applied for asylum and withholding of deportation, and in the
alternative, voluntary departure.  
In the hearing before the IJ, Nassralah admitted the allegations of fact and the
charge of deportability, but claimed that as a Coptic Catholic she would be persecuted if
returned to Egypt.  Nassralah testified in her own behalf and presented three other
witnesses to testify in her behalf – her sister-in-law, Eiman Youssef, her mother in law,
Miriam Tadros, and her husband, Ghobrial “Victor” Youssef. 
Because we are writing only for the parties who are familiar with the record and
the proceedings before the IJ and Board, we will limit our discussion to the issues of law
and the determinations of the IJ which were corroborated by the Board.  
I.
Where, as here, the Board conducts a de novo review of an IJ’s decision, we
3review the Board’s order as the final agency determination, and we also review the IJ’s
decision to the extent that the Board has adopted or agreed with it.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft,
239 F.3d 542, 548-549 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, the Board stated:
We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent
failed to demonstrate by credible testimony that she qualifies
for asylum under section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a), or withholding of deportation to Egypt under section
243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) . . . .  
(App. at 4.)  Accordingly, we review the IJ’s decision as well as the Board’s order. 
Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 548-549.  
An alien has the burden of supporting her asylum claims through credible
testimony.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  “Whether an asylum
applicant has demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
is a factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”  Id.  This
Court must sustain the Board’s adverse credibility determination if there is substantial
evidence in the record to support it.  Id.   We have recently explained the substantial
evidence test as follows:
[T]he question of whether an agency determination is
supported by substantial evidence is the same as the question
whether a reasonable fact finder could make such a
determination based upon the administrative record . . . . 
Thus, where we review [the Board’s] credibility
determination, we must ask whether the determination is
supported by evidence that a reasonable mind would find
adequate.  We look at an adverse credibility determination to
ensure that it was ‘appropriately based on inconsistent
statements, contradictory evidences, and inherently
4improbable testimony . . . in view of the background evidence
on country conditions.’
Dia v. Ashcroft, -- F.3d -- 2003 WL 22998113, at *13-*14 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2003) (en
banc) (citations omitted).  “Generally, minor inconsistencies and minor admissions that
reveal nothing about an asylum applicant’s fear of his safety are not an adequate basis for
an adverse credibility finding.”  Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).  Moreover, the Board must provide specific, cogent reasons for reaching
credibility determinations.  Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998).
The dispositive question here is whether the credibility problems are so minor and
inconsequential that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that they undermine the
story’s credibility.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-484 (1992).  We turn to the
IJ’s evaluation of Nassralah’s testimony and the accompanying determination that she
lacked credibility, which the Board adopted.
II.
The IJ delivered a detailed twenty-four page opinion discussing the testimony of
all the witnesses and concluded:
The credibility of the respondent is of extreme
importance in assessing the alien’s claim.  I have pointed out
numerous conflicts between the respondent’s testimony and
either both or either one [sic] of her applications for asylum. 
I’ve pointed out numerous contradictions between the
information contained in her two applications for asylum and
numerous conflicts between what she told the asylum officer
at her interview and the information she either gave to the
Court via live testimony or in her application for asylum. 
5And, the respondent’s witnesses are even at odds with the
respondent in some portions of their testimony.  This is a
totally incredible claim.  The respondent is doubtlessly lying
to the Court, totally fabricating an asylum application where
there is no basis for asylum at all.  The court considers this
application and the testimony of the respondent and her
witnesses to be nothing short of reprehensible in attempting
to perpetrate a fraud against this court and against the
Government of the United States . . . . 
Insofar as I have found the respondent and her
application to be totally incredible, there is no way that I can
find that she has established a prime facie case for asylum or
for withholding of deportation.  Accordingly, her asylum
application will be denied.
(App. at 28-29.)  We agree with the IJ’s determination that Nassralah failed to establish
through credible testimony that she was the victim of past persecution in Egypt and had a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her religion.
We add these comments.  Reduced to its essence, Nassralah contends that as a
member of the Christian Coptic Orthodox church her life will be threatened by Muslim
fundamentalists if she is returned to Egypt.  The IJ, however, provided specific and
cogent reasons in support of his finding that Nassralah was not credible, including
references to particular instances of inconsistent testimony, the omissions of facts from
her asylum applications and interviews, contradictions among her accounts and the
general implausibility of her contentions, all of which went to the heart of Nassralah’s
asylum claim. 
In her November 1996 asylum application, Nassralah claimed that she was a
widow and that her husband was deceased.  Later, in her 1997 application, she changed
6her story and stated that her husband was alive and willing to testify for her.   On her first
and second application, Nassralah claimed repeatedly that she was raped by Muslim
extremists.  As the IJ noted, however, Nassralah and her husband both testified that
Nassralah was not raped.  
When read as a whole, Nassralah’s testimony and the testimonies of the three
other witnesses do not corroborate Nassralah’s story regarding prior incidents involving
Muslim extremists and her fears of returning to Egypt.  Nassralah’s mother-in-law,
Miriam Tadros, testified that Nassralah and her son Victor were married in a rushed and
secret ceremony because they feared they would be attacked by a Muslim fundamentalist
leader who wanted to marry Nassralah.  The IJ found Tadros’ testimony unresponsive
and unconvincing because she was not able to tell the court more information concerning
this Muslim leader, including his name.  Tadros also testified that Nassralah had told her
that she was physically assaulted by a Muslim extremist in December of 1995.  The IJ,
however, noted that only with the prompting of Nassralah’s counsel did Tadros change
her testimony to reflect that Nassralah was sexually assaulted.  
Nassralah’s husband, Victor Youssef, testified that ten Muslim fundamentalists,
including Al Gamma, who Nassralah claims had threatened to kill her if she did not
marry him, broke in and attacked Nassralah and Youssef at their home in Algami after
Nassralah and Youssef were married.  Youssef testified that his wife, Nassralah, was
sexually molested, though not raped, and that he was beaten, lost consciousness and
7awoke in a shed tied to a pole.  Although he escaped, Youssef testified that he decided to
remain in hiding and not try to find his wife or contact the police out of fear he would be
traced.  The IJ found Youssef’s testimony to be confusing and unconvincing, noting that
“[t]he last that [the husband] remembered his wife . . . was her being molested by
fundamentalists, being mistreated, and it doesn’t make a scintilla of sense to the Court
that he would not try to make some contact with her, first of all, to determine whether or
not she was alive or dead, and second, to see her condition.”  (App. at 19.)
Although Nassralah testified that she went to the police and hospital after she and
Youssef were attacked by Muslim fundamentalists, the IJ noted that she did not submit
any documentary evidence to support these claims.  See Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (explaining
that “the INS may require documentary evidence to support a claim, even from otherwise
credible applicants, to meet their burden of proof”).  Nassralah testified that two days
after her secret marriage to Youssef, her family was beaten and their house ransacked by
Muslim fundamentalists, but this incident was not mentioned in her affidavit.  Nassralah
also testified that her husband contacted her through her brother on March 20, 1995, yet
in November 1996, she told the asylum officer that her husband was deceased.  These
inconsistencies are not minor or inconsequential, as they go to the heart of Nassralah’s
asylum claim based on past persecution in Egypt, and therefore, the IJ did not err in
finding these inconsistencies to impugn Nassralah’s credibility.
Moreover, both the IJ and the Board rejected as unconvincing Nassralah’s
8explanation for the discrepancies among her testimony, her interview, and her asylum
applications – that the asylum officer proceeded in English and only used the interpreter
during parts of the interview, which led to her confusion.  Noting, however, that
Nassralah later conceded that she used the interpreter when she did not understand what
was being asked, the IJ explained that “the Court is not clear how the respondent would
not be able to understand the questions using an interpreter that she brought with her.”  
Because a reasonable factfinder could reach the conclusion that Nassralah’s explanation
for the discrepancies is insufficient, the agency’s decision should not be disturbed.   
Lastly, we disagree with Nassralah that the Board’s order is vague and fails to
specifically adopt the decision and reasoning of the IJ.  The Board explicitly agreed with
the IJ’s credibility determination: “We agree with the Immigration Judge that the
respondent failed to demonstrate by credible testimony that she qualifies for asylum . . .
or withholding of deportation . . . ” under the Act.  (App. at 2.)  As we have explained,
the IJ’s finding rested upon several inconsistencies, discrepancies and shortcomings in
Nassralah’s testimony.  Because the Board’s adoption and affirmance of the IJ’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence in the record, we cannot hold that the Board’s
adverse credibility determination was unreasonable. 
III.
Nassralah’s petition for review of the order of the Board will be denied.
9            
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
        s/Ruggero J. Aldisert                               
      Circuit Judge
